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1. Emergence and development of legal theory 
 
The progress of science and the emergence of new disciplines are not only the fruit of genius and 
the work of the learned. At certain points in history the time seems ripe for certain ideas, for new 
approaches in the field of a branch of science or for the development of new disciplines. It is no 
coincidence that the same discovery is sometimes made by two researchers at the same time, 
independently of each other. 
Neither is it coincidental that a distinct paradigm, a scientific approach to law, is successful and is 
published by different researchers in several different countries at the same time. The emergence 
of a new approach or of a new discipline results from certain needs which are developing in 
society at a particular time. There is an awareness of deficiencies or weak points in the current 
approach and a 'demand' for new or further lines of research. 
Sometimes it is a reaction to the previous approach: the rationalism of the nineteenth century, for 
instance, gave birth to romanticism. The present discussion on deregulation is probably the 
inevitable consequence of the policy of intervention by the Welfare State. 
At other times the trend is to pursue the path mapped out by a former approach. Econometrics, 
for example, attempts to transform economic science into a more 'rigorous' and hence more 
'scientific' discipline by mathematical means. 
It is in this light that the emergence of new approaches or new branches in the science of law 
should be viewed. 
 
The emergence in the nineteenth century of the general theory of law can be explained by the 
deep-seated crisis in the science of law in Continental Europe at that time. Before the major 
codifications, legal scholars were faced with a considerable scientific and creative task. The sources 
of law were many and varied, unsystematic and difficult to find, consisting as they did of 
customary law which differed considerably from region to region, of a limited body of legislation 
and learned Roman law that was taught in the universities. The creative work consisted in 
development and systematization, principally of customary law, with the aid of Roman law. This 
type of scientific work by several generations of jurists led to the major codifications in the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example the Code Napoléon of 1804. Yet paradoxically 
legal science, in preparing the codes, dug its own grave. Customary law and Roman law had 
ceased to be important sources of law since all law was, henceforward, to be found in a clearly 
written code accessible to everyone. The application of law by the judge now seemed to have 
become an easy matter. Suddenly legal academics became redundant. What could they add to the 
code, which was the product and the apotheosis of a bimillenary legal culture? The academic was 
confined to the limited task of teaching the law. It is true that books and articles in the field of 
legal doctrine continued to be published. But in these publications, the teacher of law often did 
nothing more than recapitulate the code, adding some comments on the historical origin of the 
rule and/or some practical applications. For a creative science there seemed to be no place. Legal 
doctrine has thus undergone a profound identity crisis. 
 
Philosophy of law too experienced troubled times. The liberal society of the 1900s was fairly 
tolerant of new ideas. The confrontation with other conceptions of man and society (resulting, 
inter alia, from colonization and from amelioration and augmentation of modes of transport and 
communication) convulsed the hitherto homogeneous ideology that had provided a solid 
foundation for society. Within the realm of legal philosophy this signified a loss of belief in both a 
metaphysical natural law and a rational natural law, developed during the 17th and 18th centu-
ries (and from which the codifications had, at least to some extent, been derived). 
 
In contrast with the decline in legal science, positive science achieved an incomparable success. 
Progress in the sciences led to concrete results, plain to all, most notably to inventions and 
technical improvements, such as the train, steamboat, car, aeroplane, telegraph, telephone, 
photography, and electricity. The prestige of the positive sciences was clearly in the ascendant, 
whereas that of the science of law was undeniably declining. 
 
It is readily understandable that in this climate several jurists should from the middle of the 
century start to question the scientific nature of their discipline1. Obviously they had to compare 
their methods with the empirical methods of the positive sciences. From that point it was only 
one step to concluding that in order for an approach to law to be scientific it had to apply the 
                     
     1 1848 could be seen as a symbolic starting year, when in Germany Von Kirchmann was 
publishing his book Über die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft. Other books, bearing the 
criticism of the unscientific approach of the law by legal science in the very title, were published 
later on by several European jurists: LUNDSTEDT, A., Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der 
Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin, 1932-1936; MULDER, T., Ik beschuldig de rechtsgeleerde faculteit van 
onwetenschappelijkheid, Leiden, 1937. 
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same methods as those of the positive sciences. This realization introduced a scientific approach 
to law that could be called 'empirical natural law'. The ambition was to perform empirical 
research, historical and current, in a comparative legal perspective, hoping to find concepts and 
legal rules common to the various legal systems. They thought by applying an empirical method 
they would arrive at a scientific 'natural law'. An important representative of this conception was 
the German jurist Adolf Merkel (1836-1896), who described it as a 'positive science of law' or as a 
'general theory of law' (allgemeine Rechtslehre). In his opinion, the general theory of law would 
become the scientific successor to a metaphysical philosophy of law, whose demise was 
pronounced. The general theory of law thus became, for some of its pioneers, not only a scientific 
alternative, but also an ideological alternative. Although this conception was limited to a small 
number of champions of the (general) theory of law2, the theory of law has, both in the past and 
in our times, often been considered as a 'positivist philosophy of law', running counter any 
speculative approach of a metaphysical type3.  Radbruch, for example, spoke of the 'euthanasia' of 
legal philosophy4. On the other hand, in the minds of the majority of representatives of the 
general theory of law, both past and present, it constitutes a division of work and not a conflict 
between two concurrent approaches5. The general theory of law of the 19th century has, however, 
been applied in the course of the 20th century by representatives of widely differing trends in 
philosophy. The historical grounds that gave birth to the general theory of law have gone out of 
fashion to a large extent, although not entirely. This naive belief in a scientific model of the 
positive sciences applicable to law hardly exists today. Nevertheless, at least in Continental 
Europe, the need remains, today perhaps even more than a century ago, for a 'positive', analytical 
and (partly) empirical legal discipline, to complement legal doctrine and the philosophy of law. 
 
During the 20th century the general theory of law has evolved towards the present legal theory. 
                     
     2 See e.g.: HERAUD, G., 'Qu'est-ce que la théorie générale du droit?', Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit, 1962, p.120-121. 
     3 See e.g. the historical overview by Fasso of nineteenth and twentieth century jurisprudence, 
in which the 'théorie générale du droit' is considered to be a positivist, anti-philosophical trend 
(FASSO, G., Histoire de la philosophie du droit - XIX et XXe siècles, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1970, p.144-145). 
See also the 1962 issue of the French Archives de Philosophie du Droit, in which various articles were 
published under the title 'Qu'est-ce que la philosophie du droit?', esp.: p.95-96 (J.Brethe de la 
Gressaye), p.100 (A.Brimo), p.106 (J.Dabin), p.116-117 (G.Del Vecchio), p.128 (G.Kalinowski), 
p.143 (J. Parain-Vial). 
     4 RADBRUCH, G., Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 1914, p.16. 
     5 E.g.: KELSEN, H., 'Was ist juristischer Positivismus?', Juristenzeitung 1965, p.468. 
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The programme of this new approach may be found in the preface to the first edition of the 
'Revue internationale de la théorie du droit/Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts' published in 
1926 (by Duguit, Kelsen and Weyr). 
Instead of looking for elements common to all systems of law, the main concern is now with 
common problems: "..the scholars carry out research based on the problems that come within a 
scientific domain which we designate 'theory of law'. This is because it raises questions which 
investigate e.g. the nature of law, the relationship of law with state and society, fundamental con-
cepts and methods of legal knowledge." (Preface, p.2). 
This method appears more analytical than empirical. 
 
The evolution of legal theory was also influenced by the general evolution of the study of law 
within the context of the human sciences. During the last century new legal disciplines developed 
as independent branches of 'general' human sciences. 
Logic of law, sociology of law, anthropology of law, ethnology of law, psychology of law, semiotics 
of law, economic analysis of law thus came into being. The dispersal of scientific approaches 
created the need for an integrative discipline that is able to coordinate and systematize the 
approaches and the results of these disciplines on an interdisciplinary base. This necessary inte-
gration is a new task for legal theory. 
 
As a consequence of the critical movements of the society which developed during the 60s, 
critique of ideology, which already existed implicitly within the framework of legal theory, was also 
applied to law. Apart from those movements in thought, critical of law, which were themselves of 
an ideological nature (for example the critical legal studies in the United Kingdom), another 
purely scientific, analytical approach developed, which aimed at revealing the ideological nature of 
scientific reasoning, theories, arguments, legal constructions etc., without criticizing the ideolo-
gical content as such. The ultimate aim is to eliminate such implicit ideological elements from 
legal science and legal practice, wherever possible by eradicating them completely, or else by 
making them explicit and thus clarifying the discussion. 
 
The historical evolution as outlined above has to a large extent been confined to Continental 
Europe. In the United Kingdom the teaching of law and legal science has always been  strongly 
tied in with legal practice, to such point that the first faculty of law in England was not instituted 
until 1826, in London, although Oxford, the first English University, dated from the 12th centu-
ry. Moreover, the common law countries never had any major codifications or other disconti-
nuities in the history of their law. Nevertheless, numerous paradigms that satisfied needs in the 
society of Continental Europe can be found in Anglo-Saxon legal literature. Jeremy Bentham and 
John Austin e.g. had already spread the gospel of analytical jurisprudence at the beginning of the 
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19th century, well before the birth of the general theory of law. Analytical jurisprudence, just like 
Continental 'general legal theory', set out to establish general concepts of law, based on the 
systems of positive law and from a non-ideological perspective. On the other hand, analytical 
jurisprudence is analytical rather than empirical6. The emergence of analytical jurisprudence can 
also be accounted for by the decline of philosophies of natural law and the success of scientific 
rationalism7. 
 
 
2. Aims of legal theory 
 
2.1. The Demarcation of legal theory 
 
The literature relating to the demarcation of legal theory vis-à-vis legal doctrine is not conspicuous 
for its clarity. The consequence of a very wide definition of the object of legal doctrine and of the 
philosophy of law is that there is no longer any room for a third discipline, legal theory. In the 
final analysis this is of little importance, the real question being whether there is a genuine need 
for an approach to legal problems, which differs substantially from the doctrinal and traditional 
philosophical approaches. This means that the definition of the object of legal theory is relatively 
arbitrary and to a great extent conventional. From a survey of Continental European literature of 
the last century, a profile can be outlined and the following characteristics distinguished : 
 
(a) Legal theory can be defined as an explanatory science that studies in an analytical or 
interdisciplinary manner the theoretical problems concerning the law which are not completely 
determined by the legal rules in force in a given legal system. 
 
(b) Legal theory as an explanatory science of law concerns itself with an analytical and empirical 
study of legal phenomena, which embraces positive law and legal doctrine. 
 
(c) As with all sciences and contrary to philosophy (of law), legal theory endeavours to develop an 
approach that is non-normative and value-free. Its aim is to produce scientific results that are 
                     
     6 COTTERELL, R.B.M., 'English Conceptions of the Role of Theory in Legal Analysis', 
Modern Law Review 1983, p.686-688; SCHOFIELD, Philip, 'Jeremy Bentham and Nineteenth-
Century English Jurisprudence', The Journal of Legal History 1991, p.58-88. See also the 
Introduction by John BELL in: VAN HOECKE, M., What is Legal Theory?, Leuven 1985, p.11-25 
('Legal Theory and the Anglo Saxon World'). 
     7 COTTERELL, R.B.M., o.c., p.688. 
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relatively unconnected with philosophical theories or ideologies. 
Completely value-free science, however, is impossible, as has now been accepted even in the realm 
of the positive sciences. Moreover, as Alexy and Dreier point out, this implies that any concern 
with the problem of justice is excluded from the field of legal theory. Such a conception 
presupposes that there is no conceptually necessary connection between the law as it is and the 
law as it should be, which as such is a philosophical theory (legal positivism) that is open to 
discussion8. Attention should be paid to the fact that analytical and ideological elements are 
sometimes interlinked to such an extent that they cannot even be dissociated for the sake of 
research. Nevertheless, all legal theorists in this analytical tradition, and most prominently Hans 
Kelsen, had very sound reasons for trying to keep a clear distinction between a value-free, 
scientific approach on the one hand, and a value-laden, ideological approach on the other hand. 
This means that in pursuing legal theoretical research one can at least try to keep it as value-free as 
possible. It is clear that the strong versions of legal positivism have played a historical role in their 
reaction against heavily value-laden approaches to law in both legal philosophy and in legal 
doctrine. But it is also obvious that some form of weak positivism (e.g., the Hartian or the 
Dworkinian approach) has in general become increasingly accepted in the course of recent 
decades. 
Nineteenth-century belief in absolute scientific truth has, in the realm of the positive sciences, 
been destroyed by relativity theories such as Einstein's. In the same line of thinking, Kelsen's 
rather naive belief in keeping completely apart the law as it is and the law as it should be has 
nowadays been replaced by a more modest belief in the possibilities of segragating ideology from 
legal-theory research. 
 
(d) The theory of law raises theoretical problems of its own, i.e. which are independent of any 
concern to solve, directly or indirectly, the practical legal problems. Nevertheless, a good theory 
(for example, concerning the interpretation of law) could be expected sooner or later to bear some 
relevance to legal practice. 
The problems studied by the theory of law are not entirely bound up with legal rules in force in a 
specific legal system at a given moment. They are on a more abstract level that transcends national 
and other frontiers of the various legal systems. Questions such as those concerning the nature of 
the legal norm, the structure of legal systems, the separation of powers, the legal status (natural 
law or positive law ?) of human rights or the methodology of interpretation, cannot be studied 
independently of positive law. These problems are thus bound up with fundamental data, relating 
not to a system of law but to a legal culture. However, they remain independent of the specific 
                     
     8 DREIER,R., and ALEXY, R., 'The Concept of Jurisprudence', Ratio Juris, 1990, p. 2-3.    
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content of systems of law at a given moment within this legal culture. Legal theory can, on this 
point, be clearly distinguished from legal doctrine. 
 
 
2.2. Fields of research in legal theory 
 
The development of legal theory over the last century shows that there have been four different 
lines of research. The first two fields - the oldest and most developed ones - are the analysis of law 
and legal methodology. Two fields have emerged more recently: epistemology and methodology of 
legal doctrine, and ideological criticism of law. 
 
 
2.2.1. Analysis of law 
 
The first task of legal theory is to elucidate the concepts, mechanisms and institutions of law. 
Thus the accent is laid on the analysis of fundamental concepts such as those of 'law', 'legal norm', 
'legal system'; the nature and the hierarchy of sources of law is studied. Attention is paid to the 
various functions of law in society. This kind of research has been carried out by the analytical 
school of Kelsen and his disciples, but the contribution of sociology and psychology of law in this 
field has also been considerable (e.g. as regards the clarification of the functions of law in society, 
and the discussion of the effectiveness of legal norms). 
 
 
2.2.2. Legal methodology 
 
Traditionally the interests of researchers were oriented towards the methodology of the 
application of law, concentrating in particular on the question of judicial interpretation. A vast 
amount of literature developed in this sector and in other, related ones such as the solution of 
gaps and antinomies within legal systems, the theory of argumentation, and the qualification and 
the interpretation of facts. 
 
More recently, however, researchers have also concentrated on the methodology of the creation of 
law or the theory of legislation. Economic analysis of law, introduced in the United States with 
the aim of, inter alia, evaluating the social cost of legislation, has made a notable contribution in 
this area. 
The political theme of deregulation has also served to revive the debate on the art of legislation. 
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2.2.3. Epistemology and methodology of legal doctrine 
 
The epistemological question has been an open one since the major identity crisis with which 
legal doctrine has had to contend over the last century. From that time there has been constant 
debate on the scientific value of this body of knowledge. What is its nature? Is it descriptive, 
experimental, empirical, hermeneutic or practical ? 
Could it, once this question is resolved, be classified among the sciences? Could its scientific 
character at least be enhanced? From this perspective, it is also interesting to analyse the nature of 
the diverse conceptions with respect to legal education at the universities. 
 
 
2.2.4. Criticism of legal ideology 
 
Although this approach of analysing hidden and explicit ideological data in law is not absolutely 
new (its beginnings are to be found in the writings of Bentham and of Kelsen, for example) it has 
developed considerably since the 70s. The object here consists in tracing the philosophical 
presuppositions, the ideological prejudices and the logical inconsistencies that adversely affect the 
texts and the legal institutions which are ostensibly neutral. Almost every area of legal practice and 
legal doctrine has already been the subject of such a critical analysis. 
 
 
3. Epistemology of scientific legal theory 
 
3.1. Legal science as a theoretical corpus and as social practice 
 
As a cognitive activity aiming at a representation of legal phenomena conforming to the relevant 
scientific paradigm adopted, legal science is both a theoretical corpus and a social practice.  
As a theory, legal science constitutes a collection of systematically linked-up propositions. It 
involves the application of a consistent methodology and the obtaining of knowledge which is 
communicative and capable, if not of verification, at least of rational agreement. Whatever the 
scientific criteria used, scientific discourse sets out to rationalize the phenomena studied by 
reducing them, if not to uniformity, at least to order. More demandingly, the theory can also 
endeavour to extend its power of clarification (explanation and prediction) to new aspects of 
reality, not infrequently deviating from its common-sense representation.  
As a social practice, legal science presupposes an institutional system of research and training and 
reflects, either implicitly or explicitly, totally or partially, its interaction with values and ideologies 
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which were initially dominant in the scientific community and later in the society as a whole. 
 
Legal science can, on the basis of the very general definition presented, be developed at different 
levels, having regard to the paradigms and the scientific criteria adopted. This point is, however, 
obscured by the fact that in judicial thought the general dominant epistemological monism leads 
to exclusions and mutual criticism and condemnation. If, on the other hand, a pluralist 
epistemological perspective is adopted, it will be recognized that the scientific character is a matter 
of degree and that the different versions of legal science can be applied in a spectrum of multiple 
graduations corresponding to the diverse uses of the term 'legal science'. Thus for some, legal 
science, in the form of legal doctrine or 'legal dogmatics', consists of describing and rationalizing 
legal rules. Its specific job is the interpretation and systemization of rules. This task is sometimes 
perceived as purely theoretical, the theoretician confining himself to knowing his object. In this 
case legal science (meta-language) is clearly distinct from its object (law as a subject of language). 
The object of legal science is normative but its methods are not. Sometimes, by contrast, legal 
doctrine is considered to have the function of combining knowledge and creation, the theoretici-
an being called upon to argue in the light of the determination of the fairest solutions to 
problems raised by the application of the law. In this case, both the object and the function of 
legal science are normative. 
 
Others, however, consider that legal science is unable to lay claim to this title unless it gains its 
autonomy in relation to its object of study by acquiring the faculty to explain legal phenomena or 
at least to account for them from a critical point of view and not morely provide a description and 
a systemization of the law. This scientific approach was in turn developed in accordance with a 
variety of epistemologies and methodologies : e.g., empirical, formal logical or hermeneutic. In the 
first case, the theory which identifies which propositions relate to the observable phenomena, and 
which are susceptible to empirical verification, is scientific. In the second case, the theory in 
which the language is formalistic and the propositions incorporated into an axiomatic system, is 
scientific. In the third case, the theory that accounts as satisfactorily as possible for (or explains) 
discourse actually delivered by various lawyers, is scientific. 
 
For the most part, however, the literature presents theories which borrow, whether deliberately or 
not, elements of these various paradigms combining the various functions with which they are 
associated. 
 
Finally, it may be noted that some jurists have concluded that a science of law is not feasible 
because, for example, of the impossibility of isolating purely empirical facts in the legal field, or 
the impossibility of attaining a formalization of its language and an axiomatization of its rules. 
  
  10
 
3.2. Which epistemology? 
 
The debate aroused by these different approaches raises many questions. It appears that the most 
significant of them lies in the degree of proximity of legal science to legal practice and legal 
discourse. This question is probably basic to all scientific reasoning, but it is obviously more acute 
in the field of human sciences than in that of natural sciences, because the subject studied - 
human action - involves the use of the mind which, inevitably, involves the observer himself. If 
Wittgenstein's concept of language games is adopted, could it be said that the legal theorist should 
play the same game as the practitioner? If he does, doesn't he risk supporting the implicit 
postulates of the discourse and rationalizing the underlying ideology? If he doesn't, doesn't he risk 
failing to take account of the specific nature of his object and explaining something which is not 
real law? Legal science is deprived of its scientific character in the first case; legal science is 
deprived of its legal character in the second. 
 
The relevant epistemological question that could encompass all others is: which object, theory, 
verification, and function should be adopted for legal science? 
 
As it is not possible to discuss all these problems here, three may be examined: (a) the question of 
the paradigms, their multiplicity, their function, their historical nature, their dependence on 
dominant ideologies in society; (b) the debate that sets the advocates of explanation against those 
of understanding (sometimes represented in jurisprudence as the relationship between the 
external and the internal point of view); (c) lastly, the problems of interdisciplinarity, as distinct 
from both pluridisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. 
Here it will be argued that there is a case for a science of law, that it achieves the most fruitful 
results where it adopts an interdisciplinary form. This implies an epistemological change in 
relation to the common approaches to legal phenomena. Its point of view is external, but 
'moderately external', to the extent that it takes account of the internal point of view of lawyers. In 
other words, its aim is to explain legal phenomena by relating them to other social facts and social 
discourses, without distorting its specific character, which assumes prior understanding of the 
latter. The first job of legal science consists in identifying paradigms of doctrinal discourse itself. 
 
Adoption of this thesis does not mean contradicting the view that this legal doctrine can itself 
embody scientific elements, much as its practical utility is undeniable. It is possible that a science 
of law starting from other epistemological premises, such as empirical or formal logical ones, can 
also obtain scientific results. Contemporary 'post-positivist' epistemology appears in this respect to 
prefer criteria of truth applied by the scientific community. It is the knowledge of which language 
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game one plays, the assessment of its utility and its power of elucidation of them, that is 
important. 
 
Just as in a card game, there is a wide variety with a certain family resemblance. The game of 
scientific language is capable of diverse applications, depending the criteria adopted for scientific 
assessment. The question is, however, whether one can find some common trait constituting the 
'family lookalike'. 
 
 
3.3. Paradigms and science of law 
 
Kuhn proposed a broad sense and a narrow sense of the concept of paradigm. In the broad sense, 
the paradigm is the entire body of beliefs, recognized values and methods that are common to 
members of a given scientific community. In its narrow sense, the paradigm is a particular 
element of that group: the solution to a concrete problem that is used by researchers as a model 
or common example for the resolution of other problems that arise in the development of the 
discipline. Kuhn subsequently proposed the concept of 'disciplinary matrix' to account for the 
various elements envisaged by the paradigm in the broad sense. Among these he distinguishes 
between: (a) symbolic generalizations, kinds of formulae upon which the discipline is based (in 
physics, the action = the reaction), established laws and definitions; (b) certain shared beliefs that 
provide the scientific community with metaphors and accepted analogies; (c) the values shared by 
the members of the group of researchers concerned (e.g., coherence, simplicity, accuracy); (d) the 
paradigms in the narrow sense of common examples. 
 
The importance of this epistemological concept lies in the emphasis laid on the fact that all 
science, whatever the scientific criterion it selects, necessarily relies on ontological and axiological 
premises: a specific view of the world (e.g., deterministic, finalist, probabilistic), and a set of values. 
This shows the social and historical character of scientific practice and its interactions with the 
interests and ideologies which clash in society , either reflecting these representations or itself 
doing duty as an ideology 9. 
 
This approach is even more necessary in legal science, where the object of study, the law, is of 
such concern, politically and axiologically, to society. In addition, contemporary meta-science of 
law aims at detecting the paradigms implemented in every theory of law that claims to be 
scientific. Thus, for example, it has been argued that Continental legal dogmatics contains two 
                     
     9HABERMAS, J., Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, Franfurt, 1968. 
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central paradigms: belief in the sovereignty and the rationality of the legislator.10  These two 
postulates underlie the work involved in interpreting and systemizing texts by traditional legal 
science and make it possible to give positive responses to two essential questions which have to be 
addressed: those of the intelligibility and validity of the norms claimed to be part of the law. 
Although these postulates are only partly based on empirical observations, they impart a 'non-
positivist certainty' to the deductions of legal science in that they express the values on which 
there is a broad consensus in the community of lawyers. 
 
It is nevertheless easy, employing other paradigms, to question the scientific value of theories and 
methods based on the rationality and the sovereignity of the legislator. These principles, which 
should at the most find expression in the form of simple presumptions and regulate the process 
of reconstructing legal texts, often degenerate into irrefutable presumptions and dogmas 
incapable of verification. Thus they are not calculated to insure proper reorganization of legal 
science when the latter is faced with a crisis which involves problems as regards its internal 
coherence, as is the case today with the transition from the laissez-faire state to the welfare state. In 
the language of Bachelard one would say that such principles act as 'epistemological obstacles' 
shielding theory from all external criticism, showing how it departs from realities which should be 
taken into account and reflecting its twofold, normative character (object and function). 
 
The reaction to legal dogmatics has often taken the form of positivism. In this case the essential 
paradigm for the scientist is adherence to the objective study of reality as such. Sometimes it takes 
the form of a 'normativist' positivism (the object of legal science brings the law actually in force), 
or it may be in the form of a 'realistic' positivism (the object of legal science being the law actually 
applied). Without entering into a discussion of these two models of legal science, one need only 
point to the considerable difficulty, even impossibility, of isolating in the field of law a purely 
empirical object that lends itself to wholly objective observation and study. The validity of the 
norm derives to only a limited extent from formal and explicit legal criteria. The meaning that is 
ascribed to a norm is largely reconstituted by the judge and others when applying it, using implicit 
principles and values. 
'Open texture' thus characterizes not only every norm considered in isolation, but also the legal 
system envisaged as a whole. Analysis of the legal phenomena cannot confine itself to a 
                     
     10ZULETA PUCEIRO, E., 'Legal dogmatics as a scientific paradigm', in PECZENIK, A., et al. 
(eds.), Theory of legal science, Dordrecht - Boston - Lancaster, 1984, p. 21, VAN HOECKE, 
M., 'Aard en methode van de rechtsdogmatiek', in Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Rechtsfilosofie 
en Rechtstheorie, 1984, p. 188; OST, F., and VAN DE KERCHOVE, M., Jalons pour une 
théorie critique du droit, Brussels, 1987, p. 97. 
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description of facts the content and bounds of which are so uncertain. Otherwise it risks either 
reducing the object studied to a truncated or misleading representation, or implicitly espousing its 
suppositions and dogmas.  
Other paradigms and other criteria of scientific authenticity have also been proposed, starting 
from a clear epistemological break. This however gives then rise to the debate, typical of the 
human and social sciences, on explanation and understanding. 
 
 
3.4.Explanation and understanding - external and internal point of view 
 
It is tempting to break free of the shackles of legal concepts and methods by adopting a radically 
behaviouristic or materialistic position. One could in that case, for example, choose an object of 
study produced entirely by the theory adopted and endeavour to analyse its functioning, to 
explain it with the aid of hypotheses borrowed from other fields of study, highlighting the 
mechanisms or the determinations of legal phenomenon. One such possibility is historical 
materialism, which maintains, in any event, in its economist version, that the law is a superstruc-
ture which in the final analysis reflects relations of production in a given society. One could also 
adduce certain versions of American realism, reducing the law to judges' decisions and accounting 
for them by a complex of psychological factors. 
 
Without denying the demystification effect produced by these approaches, or the elements of 
truth they contain, it is easy to show that the objectivity sought and the explanation proposed 
mutilate legal phenomena by amputating the normative dimension which is precisely what is 
specific to them. The externality factor in this case therefore proves to be misleading and reduc-
tionist. This normative dimension is no doubt the subject of rationalization and interpretation by 
the lawyers themselves: a  self-interpretation phenomenon characteristic of the object of all the 
human and social sciences. And no doubt too, it is precisely from this self-interpretation that 
science, as conceived from the point of view of external explanation, aspires to free itself. But in 
doing so is it not perforce constrained to reduce law to fact or at least to non-legal norms? This is 
the view of other theorists who reject the paradigm of explanation in favour of that of understan-
ding11.  Externalization makes way for internalization, objectivity for subjectivity. The raison d'être 
of a social phenomenon lies in its internal sense (the sense that it has for the protagonists 
concerned), which is clarified by means of representations, conventions and rules common to the 
reference group. For the study of law, this would mean a type of knowledge that, without sharing 
                     
     11WINCH, P.,  The idea of social science and its relation to philosophy, London, 1970. 
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the normative ambitions of legal dogmatics, would embrace the paradigms (which sometimes take 
the form of myths and dogmas, as we have seen) employed in lawyers practical discourse. Here too 
it is easy to demonstrate the unsatisfactory nature of this position which deprives the scientific 
point of view of any real autonomy by conferring upon legal principles not only object-of-study 
status (which is legitimate), but also criteria for the validity of theories (which can scarcely be 
called scientific). 
 
If one rejects both the position of an external spectator and that of an internal participant12, must 
one then conclude that it is not possible to have a science of law? Not if one is willing to follow a 
third course, namely that of 'moderate external point of view' or 'point of view of the external ob-
server who relies on the internal point of view of the lawyers'13. In our language this would mean 
dialectical interaction between the paradigm of explanation and that of interpretation. While it 
seems obvious that only the objective external point of view can lead to an explanatory theory of a 
scientific nature, it is not at all incompatible with this position to adopt as an object of study the 
'internal sense' or 'self-interpretation' employed by lawyers. First of all, the legal phenomenon is 
described in discourse by the authorities and subjects of law, which involves an understanding of 
the explicit and implicit conventions in this discourse. Then in a second phase, which is strictly 
scientific, these discursive practices are explained (related in a causalist or teleological manner to a 
particular type of environmental phenomena). In a third phase this leads to a comprehensive 
reinterpretation of the object of study. The explanation therefore makes it possible to progress 
imperceptibly from naive and instinctive understanding to critical and constructive understan-
ding. Various original concepts seek to portray the complexity and specificity of this approach to 
the human sciences: Max Weber speaks of 'comprehensive explanation', Von Wright of 'quasi-
causal explanation' (to explain an action means to restore the premises of the practical syllogism 
by which it has been produced). Villa, on the other hand, considers that legal phenomena are 
'quasi-acts' and only susceptible of 'quasi-observation'. 
 
Has this process reached a point at which the various approaches are no longer relevant to the 
scientific issue? To make this assertion would be to overlook the recent developments in the 
epistemology of the natural sciences that have resulted in a far-reaching revision of the 
conventional notions of observations and of explanation. Without going further into this matter 
                     
     12VILLA, V.,  'Legal science between natural and human sciences', in Legal studies, 1984, p. 
266. 
     13HART, H.L.A., The Concept of law, London, 1961. See also MACCORMICK, N., Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford, 1978, p. 275-292.  
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we shall confine ourselves to reminding the reader that 'the facts' studied by the contemporary 
natural sciences are not drawn from and observed in 'nature' by our external senses but produced 
by the complex and artificial processes of experimentation, and thus totally mediatized by the 
techniques and the theoretical language that governs the experimental process. Consequently, the 
traditional criterion of controllability (verification or falsification) is tending to give way to the 
criterion of fecundity of scientific pronouncements: theoretical interpretation is good when it 
provides the most satisfactory explanation of known phenomena and opens up the greatest 
number of perspectives regarding phenomena not yet elucidated. Thus there is no longer a radical 
difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences and even if specific differences 
persist, these are nevertheless not so important that there could not be said to be a 'family resem-
blance' between the two approaches. 
 
What now remains is to specify the source of explanatory hypotheses adopted by legal science that 
we advocate. This involves examination of the interdisciplinary character of the science of law. 
 
 
3.5.Interdisciplinarity, pluridisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity 
 
Claiming that law explains itself by itself can only lead to pseudo-scientific speculations. 
Theoretical hypotheses adduced for the purpose of explaining legal phenomena have thus neces-
sarily to be drawn form other fields of knowledge: history, economics, psychology or sociology, for 
example. But how can the respective discourses of these various disciplines be combined? Several 
ways can be envisaged: 
 
Pluridisciplinarity (or multidisciplinarity): A series of different disciplines developing their specific 
points of view and relating to a common object of study are juxtaposed. This juxtaposition of 
knowledge obviously gives rise to as many different problems as perspectives. Only if scientific 
activity is imagined to have miracle-working powers can a mere juxtaposition of disciplines be 
believed to create a common issue. In terms of language games, the situation in this case may be 
described as no more than co-existence of different languages, producing something like a 
scientific Babel. 
 
Transdisciplinarity: In this case, the aim is, by discarding the specific standpoints of each 
discipline, to produce an autonomous body of knowledge from which new problems and new 
methods will arise. Here it is a matter of integrative disciplines. In terms of language games this 
results in the construction of a new, common language, a kind of scientific esperanto. 
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Interdisciplinarity: In this case, the research proceeds from the theoretical perspective of one of 
the disciplines involved, developing problems and hypotheses that partially overlap those evolved 
in the other discipline. This time the aim is to integrate bodies of knowledge and thus bring about 
partial reorganization of the theoretical fields concerned by successive approaches, as in a 
dialogue. In this case, one language game may be said to be 'translated' into another. There can, 
however, be no denying the difficulties and even the limits inherent in this type of exercise, in 
particular the need to respect the 'specific genius' of each scientific language. 14 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this succinct typology is that only interdisciplinarity makes it 
possible to create the conditions for genuine scientific research. Pluridisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity are more in the nature of scientific utopias: the former because it fails to build 
up an original body of theory, the latter because it transcends all known scientific fields. On the 
other hand, the interdisciplinary position is seen to be relatively unstable: it is liable at any time to 
degenerate into a mere juxtaposition of approaches (pluridisciplinarity), as it may also lead, in 
certain points of the research, to raise questions concerning transdisciplinary character. Moreover, 
the nature of the phenomenon studied (in our case the legal phenomena and the categories 
evolved by legal doctrine) may easily exert an undue influence on the scientific approach by 
imposing its criteria of truth on the discipline which it studies, or vice versa. Here one is again 
confronted with the awkward question examined above, i.e. the integration of the internal and 
the external point of view, of understanding and explanation. 
 
It may be concluded that in this complex model of an inter-disciplinary science of law, legal theory 
is called upon to play an important role which consists of the reconciliation or translation of two 
existing language games: legal doctrine (or 'legal dogmatics') on the one hand and the social 
sciences on the other.  
 
 
4. Conclusion : Perspectives of Legal Theory 
 
Current developments in legal theory show a changing paradigm. All traditional concepts, 
approaches, certainties of legal doctrine and jurisprudence are questioned and 'deconstructed' by 
new approaches, such as critical legal studies or semiotics of law. Legal theory is obviously 
searching for a new paradigm.  
                     
     14  Regarding the possibilities, but also the difficulties of this interdisciplinary method applied 
to the study of law cf. chapter 7 of the collective work : Theory of legal science (A. PECZENIK et al., 
eds.), Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984. 
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Future research, in order to prove relevant, will need to clarify this paradigm problem. It will have 
to establish a new scientific frame of reference. 
Therefore, in the field of legal theory some priority should be given to research carrying out one 
or more of the following approaches. 
 
(a) Interdisciplinary approach: theoretical study of law and legal practice has been, and still is, in 
need of fresh blood, for new approaches of legal phenomenon, e.g. psychological and economic 
analyses of law. On the other hand, this proliferation of social science approaches to law 
reinforces the need for an integrating, interdisciplinary study of law, as a reaction to the one 
dimensional picture of legal reality offered by each of these disciplines and approaches separately. 
 
(b) Macroresearch: Global approaches, the study of (sub)systems of law, should get priority over 
study of small details.  
Deep level research will probably in the long term prove of much more importance than research 
of specific topics along the lines of traditional jurisprudence. 
 
(c) Comparative approach: the obvious empirical basis of legal theory are legal systems and legal 
practices. Each theoretical research should depart from a correct analysis of this empirical 
material, not limiting itself to some intellectual construction and/or criticism based on a kind of 
self-created reality. In order to having a sufficient broad empirical basis there seems moreover to 
be a need for some new kind of 'General Theory of Law' (Allgemeine Rechtslehre): a kind of return 
to the nineteenth century approach (what is common to all legal systems ?), but at a more 
profound level, raising questions including: which are the common types of juristic discourse ? 
which are the needs and the psychological expectations to which specific theories are giving an 
adequate answer at a certain moment of time in a certain society ? These kind of questions 
transcend individual, national legal systems. The answers however can hardly be general in the 
sense the nineteenth century advocates of the Allgemeine Rechtslehre had in mind, namely some 
'empirical natural law'. These questions have to be answered within the context of some legal 
culture in the current period of history. Some problems will have to be studied in the perspective 
of (basic) cultural differences. At this moment of time however it seems that an elaborated, overall 
approach in the field of legal theory will only be possible within the limits of some legal culture, as 
e.g. European legal culture, or at the most 'Western' legal culture, as opposed to African, Islamic 
or Asian legal cultures.  
 
(d) Intercultural synthesis: the cultural limits mentioned above, although geographically and 
historically restricting the utility of the results of most legal theoretical research, will not, and 
should not make jurists renounce trying to reach more general valid results. On the contrary, it 
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will prove of the utmost importance studying these cultural differences and trying to make 
intercultural synthesis for at least some issues of common interest to the world community. E.g. 
theoretical analysis of international law will inevitably have to tackle that problem. 
 
Maybe one might get the impression that the loss of one accepted paradigm creates too much 
uncertainty, leading to a paralysing relativism. This however should not entail real problems at all 
levels of theoretical research. Actually one could, within the field of legal theory, distinguish (at le-
ast) two levels: (a) a level of 'description' of some 'legal reality' for which legal theoretical analysis is 
to a certain extent bound by the paradigm of current legal doctrine (this e.g. is the case for the 
interpretation of law), and (b) a level of 'deconstruction' of (the approaches to) legal phenomenon. 
Level (a) fulfils a need for explanation and clarification of some legal practice. Here the paradigm 
problem is less crucial. Level (b) elaborates legal theoretical analysis, criticism and constructions 
departing from a scientific and philosophical point of view. At this level, the four elements propo-
sed above for guiding future research should be fully taken into account. 
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